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Abstract 
 Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is fast growing technology which utilizes the statistical 
variability of the manufacture variations acts as a finger print to the each device. It can be widely used in 
security applications such as device authentication, key generation and Intellectual Property (IP) 
protection. Due to the simplicity and low cost arbiter delay based PUFs have been mostly used as a 
cryptographic key in Internet of Things (IoT) devices. As conventional arbiter PUFs are suffers from less 
uniqueness and reliability. This paper provides designing of new buffer based arbiter PUF. It has been 
demonstrated that experimental results of new buffer based arbiter PUF shows the considerable 
improvement in the uniqueness and reliability of the proposed design and the Monte-Carlo analysis applied 
for delay variability of the PUFs. 
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1. Introduction 
As the technology has growing many aspects of our day to day life there is a demand 
for privacy, security and trust worthyness for the hardware devices. Recent year’s authentication 
and device identification plays a critical issue for the electronics components. To ensure the 
security to hardware devices silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are emerged as one 
of the promising solution [1-4]. PUFs are the electronic circuit which utilizes the mismatch 
variations during the fabrication process generates the unpredictable responses. These 
variations without being designed explicitly or being programmed by a manufacturer. PUFs 
maps a digital input called a challenges and corresponding output called the response. This 
mapping process called the challenge-response(CRP) mechanism. various authors proposed a 
different PUF architectures such as arbiter PUFs ,ring oscillator PUFs [5-6], memory based 
PUFs [7-9] and light weight PUFs [8-9].Though many PUF architectures has been proposed 
cost, uniqueness plays a major challenge in any PUF architecture.In this paper we proposed a 
simple, low cost, more unique buffer based arbiter PUF architecture. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: sections 2 reviews the background of the 
PUF metrics , classifications of PUFs,and Section 3 involves the mathematical model for arbiter 
PUF. Section 4 explains the buffer based arbiter PUF and arbiter design techniques and final 
conclusion at section 5. 
 
 
2.    Metrics of Physical Unclonable Function 
2.1. Reliability 
It is a measure of how many number of bits to be flipped during one particular PUF 
instance under different supply and environmental conditions. This can be mathematically 
expressed in expression (1) [10]. 
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HD = Hamming distance between group of samples. 
HD intra = Average distance between the number of noisy PUF response bits. 
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2.2. Uniqueness 
It is the estimation of how uniquely a PUF can generate the PUF responses and it will 
give the information about the number of output bits are different between two PUFs. It can be 
measured with expression (2) . Where Ri, Rj are the ith and jth response of the same device of 
the PUF response. 
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2.3. Uniformity 
It implies that response of the system is either 0’s or 1’s and it should be equally 
distributed. An ideal PUF shows the 50% of the uniformity. For ‘n’ bit PUF it can be represented 
by in expression (3). 
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2.4. Classifications of PUFs  
A PUF is works on based challenge response mechanism. Typically an input 
(challenge) is to the PUF resulting it generates the corresponding response i.e. called as 
challenge-response pairs (CRP). 
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Depending upon the size of the CRP, PUFs can be classified as two types such as 
weak and strong PUFs [4-6]. Weak PUFs (Anderson PUF) have limited number of CRPs, stable 
responses from noise and environment variations for multiple readings, output response should 
be preserve private, and response is strong enough and depends on intrinsic process variations 
[8-11]. Strong PUFs (Memory and delay based PUFs) have large number of CRPs, response 
generated from an each challenge could be strong enough to environmental variations (better 
reliability), no restriction to preserve the output response, not susceptible any attacks and not 
feasible to manufacture two PUFs with the same responses. 
 
 
3. Arbiter based Physical Unclonable Function 
An arbiter PUF is a class of delay based PUFs, it can be designed by using two 
components (i) Delay network which exhibits the difference in delay paths that lead to racing 
among the paths. (ii) An arbiter which acts as a storage element and produces the response 
depending upon the input arrival from delay network. A conventional arbiter PUF architecture 
shown in Figure 1 is composite a set of multiplexers (MUX) are connected in an upper and 
lower stages, thus can be controlled by the selection lines (challenges) [12-14]. Each selection 
line acts as a challenge to a MUX and at final stage of the MUX is feed to the arbiter which 
decides the PUF response by comparing the delay differences occurred in MUX stages.  
(i.e., due to manufacturing process variations lead to significant delays in MUX). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Silicon multiplexers based PUF 
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3.1. Mathematical Model for Arbiter PUF 
The delay differences caused due to manufacture process variations can be modeled 
by additive linear delay model, it approximates the variations of delays by statistical timing 
analysis (SSTA) by Gaussian distribution. Therefore the process variations can be classified as 
a two types 1.interdie variation (die to die) and 2.intradie variation (with in the single chip). In the 
arbiter PUF each MUX can be treated as a independent identical distribution (IID) random 
variable i.e. modeled as a Gaussian random variable N (µ, σ2).µ represents the mean and σ 
represents the standard deviation [15]. The delay network consists of ‘n’ number of stages then 
the delay difference of n stages can be represented as N (Nµ, Nσ2). Expression (4) measures 
the delay difference between top stage and bottom stage of MUX’s. 
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The response is dependent on the delay differences of the two paths and sign of the 
delay differences can be determined by external bits. The delay difference of the last stage can 
be represent by expression (5) and (6). 
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The above additive linear model is used to represent the final response of the MUX 
PUF. The skew effect of the arbiter also affects the performance of the MUX based PUFs by 
reducing the uniqueness, producing the biased response that degrades the security of the PUF. 
Hence to improve the uniqueness of the arbiter PUF we proposed a new PUF architecture as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Buffer based arbiter multiplexers PUF 
 
 
4. Buffer based Arbiter PUF 
Original arbiter PUFs as shown in Figure 1 are linear PUFs which are easily attacked by 
side channel effects and has the less uniqueness. Hence to improve the uniqueness proposed a 
32 stage buffer based arbiter structure. Here by incorporating the buffers at the intermediate 
stage of the mux based arbiter PUF, this leads to non-linearity of the arbiter PUFs, thereby it 
uses the racing which results increases the complexity of the numerical modeling  
attacks [16-17]. However this structure degrades the reliability of the PUF. Figure 2 depicts the 
buffer based arbiter PUFs and its corresponding layout shown by Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Buffer based arbiter multiplexers PUF Layout  
 
 
4.1. Arbiter Design Techniques 
An arbiter is a digital circuit which commonly used as a decision element in the arbiter 
PUFs and it can capture the delay differences occur during the fabrication process variability 
and determines the which input arrives first. Typically The most commonly used arbiter 
elements are D-latch and SR-latch. This can be used to detect the path differences by 
comparing the delays from the PUF network .The final response of the MUX network are fed to 
the R and S inputs of a SR-latch. Depending upon the relative delay differences, different values 
at output of Q. Figure 4 illustrstes the SR-latch [17]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. SR-Latch 
 
 
5. Experimental Simulation 
The manufacturing process variations cannot be controlled during thefabrication. These 
variations are considered to be statistical variations of the physical materials. The sources of 
variations are distinguished by two types such as variations in process parameters (i.e. due to 
oxide thickness, impurity concentration, diffusion depths) and the second category covers the 
variations in dimensions of the devices (i.e. during the photo-lithography process).these 
variations can be captured by using commercial simulators such as cadence spectre by 
applying the Monte-Carlo simulation to determine the best logic design for a PUF. Here the 
main aim of the design a delay based PUF is to generate the unique response and generated 
response should be stable for the wide range of the temperatures. 
In order to achieve this we applied the same set of sequence challenge to the conventional 
arbiter PUF and proposed buffer based arbiter PUF and applied the Monte-Carlo simulation using 
spectra cadence on Virtuoso 6.1.7, platform with 180nm CMOS technology. Experimental results 
found that due to the non-liner delay of proposed logic circuit generated the unique response. Hence 
to figure out the unique response we applied the 32 bit challenge to the both the PUFs and we have 
estimated the standard deviation and compared the responses of two logics designs using Hamming 
Weight Distance (HWD) by changing the channel length (L) and widths (W) of the transistors. 
Figures 5 and 6 shows the estimation of HWD for delay and buffer based arbiter PUFs respectively. 
Buffer based PUF shows the 1.1 times better mean value than delay based PUF with 150 samples 
at VDD range from 0 V to 1.8 V. Delay based PUF has 99.1% lesser standard deviation when 
compared to buffer based PUF for 150 samples at VDD range from 0 V to 1.8 V. 
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Figure 5. Estimation of Hamming weight Distance (HD) for delay based arbiter PUF for VDD 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Estimation of Hamming weight Distance (HWD) of buffer based arbiter PUF for VDD 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 depicts the estimation of uniqueness of delay and buffer based arbiter 
PUF with respect to delay variability (linear & Non-linear) respectively. Table 1 and Table 2 
describes the performance analysis (Uniqueness, Mean HD and Reliability) of delay and buffer 
based arbiter PUFs with temperature variation impact at VDD=1.8V. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Estimation of uniqueness of delay based arbiter PUF with respect to  
delay variability (linear) 
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Figure 8. Estimation of uniqueness of buffer based arbiter PUF with respect to  
delay variability (non-linear) 
 
 
Table 1. Temperature Variation Impact in Delay based Arbiter PUF at VDD=1.8V 
Temperature 00c 200c 400c 600c 800c 1000c 
Uniqueness 48.36% 48.86% 48.36% 48.47% 48.96% 48.56% 
Mean HD 50.12% 50.72% 50.88% 50.01% 50.99% 50.77% 
Reliability 89.63% 89.45% 88.65% 87.65% 86.54% 85.56% 
 
 
Table 2. Temperature Variation Impact in Buffer based Arbiter PUF at VDD=1.8V 
Temperature 00c 200c 400c 600c 800c 1000c 
Uniqueness 49.78% 49.12% 49.77% 49.88% 49.56% 49.75% 
Mean HD 52.88% 52.14% 52.47% 52.78% 52.54% 52.58% 
Reliability 86.53% 85.78% 85.69% 84.78% 83.99% 83.83% 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper helps to understand the statistical properties of delay based PUFs by Monte 
Carlo analysis. To choose the appropriate arbiter configuration based on the comparison of 
HWD of PUF responses. More considerably it improves delay variability of the proposed 
architecture there by significant improve in the responses of the PUF, hence it can be chosen as 
a wide range of the security applications such as device authentication, cryptographic key 
generation etc. Buffer based PUF shows the 1.1 times better mean value than delay based PUF 
with 150 samples at VDD range from 0V to 1.8V. As a future work, it can be intended to fabricate 
the proposed buffer based arbiter PUF and analyze the effects due to environmental changes 
and work out the findings of the other delay based PUFs. 
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